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  In the last decade, the analytical progress achieved in the New Keynesian 
literature has been remarkable. Many of the early assumptions have been 
relaxed, leading to medium-scale macroeconomic models that are now able to 
capture many features of real-world data. Nevertheless, modern-day New 
Keynesian models still assume, as did their early counterparts, that firms compete 
in the market with no tools other than their relative prices. In particular, this 
literature has so far neglected the consequences of extending competition 
between firms to the non-price dimension. This paper tries to fill this gap by 
enriching the canonical New Keynesian framework to include both price and 
non-price competition. This has important consequences for the analysis of 
inflation dynamics, modifying in particular the inflation-marginal cost 
relationship. As a general result, we show that any activity by firms that boosts 
demand for their products, without directly affecting their prices, dampens the 
overall degree of real rigidities in price-setting.  
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 31 Introduction
In the last decade, the analytical progress achieved in the New Keynesian literature has been
remarkable. Many of the early assumptions have been relaxed, leading to medium-scale macroe-
conomic models that are now able to capture several features of real-world data. As such, the
New Keynesian framework has became a workhorse for the analysis of monetary policy in both
academic and central-banking circles.
Nevertheless, modern-day New Keynesian models still assume, as did their early counterparts,
that rms compete in the market with no tools other than their relative prices. This literature
particularly lacks a formal study that explicitly evaluates the consequences of extending competi-
tion between rms to the non-price dimension. In fact, in general equilibrium models with nominal
rigidities, the rms' behavior is typically modeled by abstracting from any decisions concerning
expenditures for non-price tools, such as investment in quality, advertising and customers' ser-
vices. This paper tries to ll this gap by extending the canonical New Keynesian framework to an
environment where rms face, at the same time, both price and non-price competition.
In this paper, non-price competition refers to any activity by rms that shifts the demand
for producers, both their own and those of their rivals, without directly aecting their prices.
Several aspects make this dimension of the rms' competition a theoretically interesting feature
in models with nominal rigidities. First, assuming, as in the New Keynesian literature, that rms
compete for the market only through their relative prices is a simplication that is not always
realistic. This is particularly true in oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive industries in
which non-price tools often drive the major source of inter-rm rivalry. Furthermore, real-world
data suggest that rms in fact devote large amounts of resources to these activities. In the US
economy, for example, aggregate expenditures on advertising and research and development (R&D)
in the second half of the last century have accounted, on average, for almost 5% of GDP.1 Similar
magnitudes characterize advertising and R&D markets in other industrialized countries.2
Second, although we have identied non-price tools as demand shifters that do not directly
modify output prices, non-price competition among rms may still have indirect eects on their
pricing behavior. As emphasized in the industrial organization literature, a typical feature of non-
price tools is that they may modify the degree of substitutability among goods.3 For instance, by
spending on advertising, a rm may successfully persuade customers about peculiar characteristics
of its product, or by investing in quality (product innovation), it may increase the degree of dif-
ferentiation between its product and those of its rivals. Through these activities, therefore, rms
may successfully build customers' loyalty for their products, thereby gaining monopolistic and
pricing power. This feature is particularly interesting in light of the New Keynesian theory. This
literature has in fact emphasized rms' pricing behavior as a key determinant for both in
ation
dynamics and the persistence of the real eects of monetary policy shocks. From this perspective,
therefore, by interacting with the rms' pricing behavior, non-price competition may also aect
in
ation dynamics. The current New Keynesian literature overlooks this interesting linkage pre-
cisely because it assumes that rms compete for the market with no tools other than their relative
prices. Therefore, the analysis provided in this paper will focus in particular on understanding
1This statistic refers to data taken from 1950 to 2003. Data for R&D and advertising expenditures
are respectively taken from the National Science Foundation (www.nsf.org) and the Newspaper Association
of America (http://www.naa.org). Figures for GDP are taken from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
2See Molinari and Turino (2007) for an international comparison.
3In fact, in this literature, non-price competition tools, such as advertising and R&D for product innovation, are
often modeled as aecting the degree of substitutability among goods. See, for instance, Lambertini and Mantovani
(2008) and the references they provide.
4whether and how non-price competition among rms can aect in
ation dynamics.
To address this issue, we develop a variant of the Calvo model (1983) by extending the canonical
framework to an environment where rms also engage in non-price competition. Building on Spence
(1977), this feature is introduced in the model by assuming that consumers' tastes are endogenously
determined, depending on the distribution of non-price activities across all the rms. To emphasize
that our results depend only on the interaction between non-price policy and pricing behavior, we
further assume that rms engage in a purely combative non-price competition context, in the
sense that non-price activities by a rm expand the demand for its products by drawing existing
customers away from rival products.
The analytical framework of this paper departs from the assumption of constant elasticity of
substitution among goods, which is typically made in a Calvo-style model, and instead assumes a
more generic specication, such as that used in Kimball (1995), that allows for demand functions
featuring a non-constant price elasticity (quasi-kinked demand). Several reasons justify this mod-
eling strategy. First, adopting Kimball preferences allows the obtaining in a relatively simple way
the linkage between non-price competition activities by rms and product dierentiation among
goods of dierent producers. As we will see next, with non-constant elasticity of demand, changes
in non-price activities that aect the distribution of market shares across rms in turn aect the
elasticity of demand faced by each individual producers, and hence the degree of substitutabil-
ity of their products. Second, an environment where rms face demand functions featuring a
non-constant price elasticity appears to be the most appropriate theoretical ground for evaluating
non-price competition in a model with nominal rigidities. In this context, in fact, a producer, in
increasing its own relative price, faces a higher opportunity cost, as the loss of customers resulting
from the downward sloping demand curve is amplied by the price elasticity being an increasing
function of the relative price. In a such a circumstance, therefore, it should be potentially more
convenient for a producer trying to boost prots to aect demand through non-price tools, which
do not directly involve price movements.
Within this analytical framework, the joint role of non-price competition and rms' pricing
policies in the determination of the aggregate price level is analyzed by focusing on the reduced-
form in
ation dynamics represented by the New Keynesian Phillips curve. To preview our results,
we nd that non-price competition does aect in
ation dynamics, by increasing the in
ation-
marginal cost coecient. This result hinges on the property that, under very general assumptions,
non-price competition generates a mechanism that dampens the overall degree of real rigidity in
price-setting. In our framework, in fact, pricing and non-pricing policies are strategic complements,
so that, through non-price tools, a rm mitigates the eect upon its market share made by price
movements. This reduces the opportunity cost that price-setters face in changing their relative
price, mitigates the degree of real rigidity and eventually increases the size of price changes. As a
result, if rms engage in non-price competition, in
ation becomes more sensitive to movements in
marginal cost.
From the perspective of New Keynesian theory, our results are relevant because they show
that allowance for non-price competition among rms generates a mechanism that dampens the
overall impact of real rigidities on in
ation dynamics. This issue is particularly important, as real
rigidities have became popular among New Keynesian theorists precisely because they provide a
mechanism to amplify the eect of nominal disturbances and, all else being equal, to reduce the
size of the Phillip curve's slope. In light of these features, real rigidities in price-setting, also
refereed to as strategic complementarities, are now recognized as important theoretical ingredients
of modern-day New Keynesian models. For instance, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) have shown
that extending the canonical Calvo model by assuming rm-specic capital and demand functions
to have non-constant elasticity of demand (quasi-kinked demand) allows one to pin down a realistic
5degree of nominal rigidities. Smetz and Wouters (2007) have used quasi-kinked demands function
in an estimated monetary DSGE model. Sbordone (2008) extends the Kimball model to study
the eect of globalization on in
ation dynamics. Our analysis casts some doubt regarding the
robustness of such conclusions, showing that abstracting from non-price competition, as canonical
model do, may potentially overstate the overall impact of strategic complementarities on in
ation
dynamics. This therefore suggests that enriching the New Keynesian framework to include non-
price competition among rms may be a promising feature in order to improve our understanding
on the key determinants of in
ation dynamics. This should be particularly true in economy, as the
US one, in which non-price competition appears to be an important dimension of the inter-rm
rivalry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy and provides the
main results; Section 3 concludes.
2 A simple economy with non-price competition
In this section we lay out a baseline framework that captures the key features of non-price
competition in a context of nominal and real rigidities. The specic framework we develop is a
variant of the canonical model discussed in Kimball (1995). The main dierence is that in our
model, rms may also engage in non-price competition by spending on activities that expand
their customer bases. This modication results in non-trivial consequences for in
ation dynamics,
aecting in particular the in
ation-marginal cost relationship. As a general result, we show that
any activity by rms that boosts demand for their products, without directly aecting their prices,
dampens at the same time the overall degree of real rigidities in price-settings.
2.1 Households
The economy consists in a continuum of dierentiated goods index by i 2 [0;1], each produced
by a monopolistically competitive rm and over which consumer preferences are dened. More









di = 1 (1)
where ct(i) denotes the quantity consumed of variety i;  (:) is an increasing and strictly concave
function, with  (1) = 1, while bt(i)  0 satises the following condition:
Assumption 1.
bt(i) =  (zt(i)) (2)
where  is a positive, strictly increasing and strictly concave function, with (1) = 1; zt(i) =
Zt(i)=Zt denotes rm i's non-price activities relative to the market average.
Equation (1) extends Kimball's (1995) preferences to an environment where rms engage in
non-price competition. To embed this feature into the model, we follow Spence (1977) by assuming
that consumers' preferences are endogenously determined, depending on the distribution of non-
price activities across rms. For each variety i, this linkage is controlled by the term bt(i), whose
properties are restricted in order to guarantee that the desired requirements for non-price com-
petition are fullled in this general setup. This feature will be apparent by deriving the demand
6curve for each individual variety. The latter is the solution to the dual problem of minimizing










where  0 1 denotes the inverse function of  0, Pt(i) is the price of good i, and t is the Lagrange










di = 1 (4)
For future reference, notice that here, in contrast with the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework,
the Lagrange multiplier, t, does not need to coincide with the price index Pt. The latter is usually

















Given (3), the monotonically increasing behavior of bt(i) implies that the demand of each
variety is also increasing in the producer's relative non-price activities. To see this, notice that






("p;t(i)   1)v0(zt(i)) (6)
where "p;t(i) is the demand price elasticity for good i which will be formally introduced shortly.
Since for the rms' optimization problem to be well-dened it is required that "p;t(i) > 1, we nd
that @ct(i)=@zt(i) > 0 8 i 2 [0;1].
This property hinges on the assumption that consumers' tastes are endogenously determined.
In fact, in our framework the consumers' marginal utility of each variety is also increasing in the
producer's relative expenditures for non-price competition. To see this, notice that applying the
implicit function theorem to equation (1) in order to derive an expression for the marginal utility











v0(zt(i)) > 0 8 i 2 [0;1]
where D  is a positive constant4 and xt(i) = (ct(i)bt(i))=Ct. Hence, any asymmetrical distribution
of non-price activities across rms aects consumers' demand precisely because it modies the
consumers' marginal evaluation of each variety. For equal prices, in particular, a household will
devote a higher fraction of its income in products whose producers spent the most to gain an
advantage in the non-price competition in their market. Alternatively, the demand of each variety
will increase in response to an increment in the producer's non-price expenditures.




0 (xt(i))xt(i)di. By assumption  t(xt(i)) is a strictly increasing and
strictly convex of function of xt(i), so the integrand  
0 (xt(i))xt(i) is then a positive and continuous function. As
such, the above integral is a positive real number.
7This feature has a natural interpretation in terms of the degree of substitutability among
goods. Intuitively, we can think that non-price activities by a rm, such as marketing promotions
or investment in quality, by attaching peculiar attributes to the product, increase the consumers'
perceived dierentiation with respect to rival products. Consider, for instance, a producer that
increases its relative expenditures on non-price competition. In our framework, this directly af-
fects the consumer's tastes, making that product more valuable in terms of utility. As such, the
consumers' cost of switching from that good to another, for example, as the former becomes more
expensive, increases. Equivalently, the degree of substitutability between that good and the ri-
val products decreases. Because of this perception of product dierentiation, consumers are then
willing to pay a higher price for that good and, for a given price, the producer's market share
increases.
As a second property, we note that the demand for each product is decreasing in the average
expenditure for non-price competition. This is an immediate implication of the assumption that
for any variety i, the factor bt(i) depends upon the producer's relative expenditures zt(i). In fact,






("p;t(i)   1)"b;z(i) < 0
where "b;z(i) > 0 denotes the percentage change in bt(i) resulting from a percentage variation
of zt(i). Hence, our formulation captures the fact that rms engage in a combative non-price
competition context in the sense that an increase in expenditure for non-price tools of a suciently
large fraction of rms creates a negative externality on the demand faced by other rms. This
means that in our framework non-price competition is a zero-sum game, since non-price activities
by a rm increase demand by drawing existing consumers away from rival products. Therefore,
any asymmetrical distribution in non-price activities merely redistributes demand among rms,
thereby causing an asymmetrical distribution in market shares.
One important feature of the Kimball aggregator (1) is that it generalizes the standard Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences,5 allowing for a non-constant elasticity of demand with respect to relative price.





which shows that the CES aggregator is in fact a special case of (1) obtained by specifying the
function  (xt(i)) so that the ratio  0(xt(i))=[xt(i) 00(xt(i))] is constant 8 xt(i). As Kimball (1995)
has shown, it is always possible to nd a specic functional form for  (xt(i)) that matches any
desired dependence of the elasticity of demand on the rm's relative output. Here, in order to
introduce strategic complementarity in price-setting, we are interested in the functional form for
 (xt(i)) that generates `quasi-kinked' demand functions, characterized by the property that for
the rm at its normal market share, it is easier to lose customers by increasing its relative price
than to gain customers by lowering its relative price. This requires that the price elasticity is
decreasing in the rm's relative sales (market share). However, the assumptions we have made
so far do not have any implications for the sign of "0
p;t(i). Therefore, hereafter we conne our





p;t(i)bt(i) < 0 (8)
5The Dixit-Stiglitz preferences are obtained, as a special case, by setting  (xt(i)) = xt(i)
"=(" 1), with " > 1.
8where my;t(i) = ct(i)=Ct is the rm i's market share, and "0
p;t(i) = @"p;t(i)=@xt(i).
The next proposition summarizes an important implication resulting from non-price competi-
tion in an environment where producers face quasi-kinked demand functions.
Proposition 1. Let the households' consumption aggregate be of the form (1). Then, for any
functions  (xt(i)) and bt(i) satisfying assumptions 1-2, the demand price elasticity of each variety
i, "p;t(i), is decreasing in the producers' relative non-price activities.





















p;t(i) my;t(i)"p;t(i) v0(zt(i)) (9)









Therefore, for any function  (xt(i)) that satises assumption 2, it must be true that
@"p;t(i)
@zt(i)
< 0 8 zt(i) > 0
since sign("0
p;t(i)) < 0 8 xt(i) > 0.
Accordingly, for each variety i, the producer's relative expenditures for non-price competition
not only shift the demand schedule but also reduce price elasticity. While the rst eect is a
direct consequence of assumption 1, the second is instead entirely due to assumption 2. As is
apparent from equation (9), with CES preferences, an increase in the rm's relative non-price
activities would just generate a parallel upward shift in the demand schedule without aecting
the slope. Furthermore, the eect of non-price activities on the demand price elasticity uniquely
depends upon the linkage between the latter and the rm's relative price. In fact, assuming
strategic substitutability in price-setting6 would instead have the eect of making the demand
price elasticity an increasing function of rm's non-price activities. Therefore, it turns out that
in our framework assumption 2 is a necessary condition to obtain a positive linkage between the
intensity of non-price competition and rms' market power.
2.2 Firms
In this model, rms make decisions on pricing policy, production plans and budgets for non-
price competition. In order to explicitly analyze the rms' behavior, we therefore require further
assumptions concerning the technology available for producing goods, the type of market and
technology characterizing non-price activities and the source of nominal rigidities. To this end,
hereafter we conne our attention to a model economy satisfying the following two conditions:
6That is, assuming that @"p(i)=@my;t(i) > 0.
9Assumption 3. Prices are set in staggered contracts with random duration as in Calvo (1983):
in any period, each rm faces a constant probability (1 ) of being able to re-optimize and charge
a new price.
Assumption 4. There exists an economy-wide labor market, with nominal wage Wt, from which
rms hire labor for the production of both consumption goods and non-price activities. All the
rms have access to a common technology of the form Atfs(hs;t(i)) with s = fy;zg, where fs(:) is
a strictly increasing and concave function; hs;t denotes hours for producing goods (s = y) or non-
price activities (s = z), and At is a (stochastic) factor that describes the evolution of technology.
Assumption 3 introduces nominal rigidities by assuming staggered prices a la Calvo; every
period, only a fraction (1 ) of the rms can set a new price, independently of the past history of
price changes. Assumption 4 instead describes the technological structure of the model economy.
It states that rms produce goods as well as non-price activities by using a common technology
that requires only labor. While we could proceed by making rather general assumptions about
the market for these non-price activities, we choose to simplify the analysis by assuming, as in
Grossmann (2007), that rms produce these tools in-house. However, this choice is inconsequential
to our main conclusions.7
The rms' optimization problem can be solved in an equivalent two-step procedure. In the
rst step, a rm chooses the amount of labor for the production of goods and non-price activities
by minimizing the total cost function subject to technology constraints. Given assumption 4, the











where wt denotes the real wage, while t(i) and 't(i) are the marginal costs for producing consump-
tion goods and non-price activities, respectively. While we have assumed an economy-wide labor
market, equation (10) indicates that decisions concerning demand of labor input are instead rm-
specic. This feature implies that production marginal cost depends not only on economy-wide
factors but also on the rm's own output. In a model based on the Calvo pricing mechanism,8 this
generates strategic complementarity in price-setting that reduces the size of price changes and, all
else being equal, lowers the sensitivity of in
ation to marginal cost. To see why, take the example
of a contractionary monetary shock. In this case, adjusters would nd it convenient to reduce their
prices in order to boost their prots. However, if marginal cost is rm-specic, adjusters trying to
boost its sales by undercutting others would also be increasing their own production marginal cost.
This reduces prots from undercutting, thereby making price-setters less inclined to undercut the
xed prices of their competitors. As a consequence, the size of price changes declines, thereby
reducing the sensitivity of in
ation to movements in real marginal costs.
In the second step, a rm seeks to maximize prots by choosing price and non-price expendi-
tures, Zt(i). Given the cost-minimizing conditions, the instantaneous real prot at date t for rm
i can then be written as
(pt(i);Zt(i);t) = pt(i)yt(i)   TC (Zt(i);yt(i);t) (12)
7One can easily show that this restriction is equivalent to assuming a perfectly competitive market for non-price
activities, where producing rms use the same technology as an assumption 4.
8See Sbordone (2002) for further details.
10where pt(i) = Pt(i)=Pt is the rm relative price at date t, TC(:) is the cost function, t is a vector
containing all the exogenous variables aecting prots, and yt(i) the demand curve for the good i










where Yt denotes aggregate demand.
It should be noted here that the assumptions we have made so far are not enough to guarantee
that the prot function attains its maximum at some interior point. Therefore, in order to make
the analysis of the rst order conditions meaningful, hereafter we restrict the space of admissible
functions by considering only functional forms for  (xt(i)) and bt(i) that satisfy the following
condition:
Assumption 5. The prot (pt(i);Zt(i);t) is a single-picked function of its rst two arguments,
with a maximum at some positive vector (pt(i);Zt(i)) for any values of its other arguments.



























t+k with probability 
p
t+k(i) with probability (1   )
where Qr
t;t+k = Qt;t+kt+k is the real stochastic discount factor9, t+k = Pt+k=Pt+k 1 is the
in
ation rate at date t + k, and p
t+k(i) denotes the optimal relative price chosen by a resetting
rm at date t + k. The rst-order condition with respect to non-price activities is given by:
@yt(i)
@Zt(i)




Accordingly, in order to maximize prot, a rm chooses the non-price competition budget such
that the increase in revenues resulting from an additional unit of non-price expenditures is equal
to the corresponding increase in total cost. This equation implies an optimal rule for non-price
activities in terms of its ratio to total sales. To see this, notice that dierentiating (13) with respect
to Zt(i), plugging the resulting equation into (14) to substitute out the derivative of demand with









9Under the maintaining assumptions of perfect nancial market and households that holds the ownership of the







where  is the subjective discount factor and t+k is the marginal evaluation of consumption at date t + k.
11where "z;t(i) denotes the elasticity of the demand function with respect to spending for non-price
tools, which in turn is given by:
"z;t(i) = ("p;t(i)   1)"b;z(i) (16)
For any rm i, the intensity of non-price competition is therefore proportional to the ratio of
average net revenues from sales to non-price marginal cost, where the factor of proportionality is
given by the elasticity of demand with respect to non-price tools, "z;t(i). Interesting, this equation
reveals that rms' pricing and non-pricing policies are in fact directly related. According to (15),
a rm will nd it convenient to increase its non-price budget in response to an increase in the unit
net revenue from sales caused by a higher relative price. Using the terminology of Iwasaki et al.
(2008), this means that in our framework, rms play a super-modular game, since their pricing
and non-pricing policies are complementary strategies.10








("p;t+k(i)   1)[pt+k(i)   t+k(i)t+k(i)]
)
= 0 (17)





The presence of a demand featuring a non-constant price elasticity modies the optimal choice
of a price setter along a crucial dimension; the desired markup becomes an increasing function of
the rm's relative output. As it is well-known (see Woodford (2003)), for a re-optimizing rm, this
mechanism increases the cost of deviating from the prices charged by others, making rms more
reluctant to change their prices when this action is allowed. As we will see next, in the aggregate
this mechanism reduces the sensitivity of in
ation to marginal costs, leading to a 
attened Phillips
curve. However, this result is obtained under the crucial assumption that rms compete for the
market with no instruments but their relative output prices. As we have seen before, extending the
Kimball framework to an environment with non-price competition implies that the demand price
elasticity is by itself a decreasing function of non-price activities, and the rm's desired mark-up
is thus increasing in these tools. This clearly aects the rms' pricing behavior, since it modies
the opportunity cost of changing relative prices. However, the extent to which this mechanism
aects the in
ation dynamics depends, in turn, on the kind of relation existing between pricing
and non-pricing policies. This is what is analyzed in the next section.
2.3 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
To derive an expression for the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the context of non-price
competition, we restrict the attention to a linear approximation of the equilibrium dynamics around
a zero-in
ation steady-state. Hereafter, a hat on a variable denotes the log deviation of the original
variable with respect to its steady state, while a variable evaluated at the steady-state is indicated
by suppressing indexes i and t from the original variable.
10Super-modular games are a general class of noncooperative games where n players simultaneously choose a set
of strategies. See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for further details. Iwasaki el al. (2008) discuss the general property
of advertising that unequivocally leads to a supermodular game in the context of an oligopolistic market in which
rms simultaneously choose their advertising budgets and pricing policy.
11That is the optimal mark-up a rm would have chosen in the context of 
exible prices.













k "b;zEt~ zt+k(i) (19)
where " > 0 is the elasticity of the desire markup function with respect to the rm market share,13
 2 (0;1) denotes the long-run stochastic discount factor, sy > 0 is the steady-state elasticity of
the production marginal cost with respect to rms' relative output,   = [1 + "p (" + sy)], ~ pt+k(i)
= ^ p
t(i)   ^ Pt+k and ~ zt+k(i) = ^ Zt+k(i)   ^ Zt+k.
The standard case without non-price competition can be recovered from the previous equation
by setting "b;z equal to zero. In such a case, with standard manipulation, one can obtain the
following familiar form of in
ation dynamics as a function of the expected future in
ation and
aggregate marginal cost:
^ t = Et^ t+1 + ^ t (20)
where  is dened as:
 =




1 + "p (" + sy)

(21)
Equation (21) formalizes the eect of real rigidities in price-setting on in
ation dynamics. The
slope  becomes the product of two terms, where the rst corresponds to the slope we would obtain
in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case (i.e., " = 0) with a constant return to scale (sy = 0), while
the second is known as the strategic complementarity term. Hence, in our setup there are two
channels through which real rigidities aect the in
ation-marginal cost relation: (i) the sensitivity
of the rm's desired markup to relative prices, "; (ii) the sensitivity of marginal cost to the rm's
relative output, sy. In both cases, the eect is stronger with increases in demand price elasticity,
"p.
Returning to our point, to precisely evaluate how the presence of non-price competition aects
in
ation dynamics, we rst need to model the evolution of the rm i's relative expenditures for
non-price activities. In fact, equation (19) involves the latter at a sequence of future dates, which
in turn depends upon the optimal policy (14). Therefore, using the theory we have developed in
the previous section, we nd a result of the following form.
Proposition 2. Let the households' consumption aggregate be of the form (1), and suppose that
the model economy has the structure described by assumptions 3 and 4. Then, for any functions
 (x) and bt(i) satisfying assumptions 1, 2 and 5, the New Keynesian Phillips curve has the repre-
sentation:
^ t = Et^ t+1 + np ^ t (22)
with:
np =




1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy]

(23)
12See the Appendix for further details on the derivation.
13More precisely, "(i) denotes the elasticity of the markup function with respect to xt(i). However, denoting
with ";my;t(i) the elasticity with respect to rm i's market share, the following equality holds:
";my;t(i) = "(i)bt(i)
so that at the steady-state the two expressions coincide.
13where the coecients 0 and 1 are strictly positive functions of the model structural parameters,
such that 0 > 1.
In addition, the slope np possess the following properties:
(i) np > , where  is dened as in (21).
(ii)
@np
@" < 0. Moreover:
np >





 v00(1) + "b;z [sy"b;z + sz + 2"b;z]
)





B, with B  R+ is a set of real numbers dened as in the appendix.14
Proof. See the appendix.
Several remarks are in order. First of all, the proposition conrms that for a rm, pricing and
non-pricing policies are strategic complements.15 As shown in the Appendix, the rm i's relative
expenditures on non-price activities can be expressed as a function of its own relative price as:
~ zt(i) = z~ pt(i) (24)
where z is a strictly positive function of the model's structural parameters.16 For any rm i,
therefore, relative spending in non-price activity accommodates movements in relative prices. The
elasticity z measures in particular the extent to which a rm manages its non-price policy in order
to oset real rigidities in price-settings.17 In fact, it is possible to show that without assuming
rm-specic marginal costs and quasi-kinked demand functions, the coecient z is equal to zero,
and, up to a order linear approximation, the rms' expenditures for non-price competition are
independent of their relative prices.18
One way to think about this is that strategic complementarities strengthen rms' incentives
to engage in non-price competition. To see this, suppose that a price setter deviates from the

exible price equilibrium by charging a higher price. This immediately increases the demand price
elasticity, thus amplifying the loss of customers resulting from the downward-sloping demand
schedule. At the same time, because of the lower market share, marginal cost decreases, and the
production of one unit of consumption goods becomes less expensive. In such a circumstance,
the rm's incentive to increase its relative expenditures on non-price tools strengthens. On the
one hand, because of the negative eect on the demand price elasticity, by increasing the relative
expenditures on non-price tools, a rm may partially oset the loss of customers caused by the
14Here, the coecient sz denotes the long-run elasticity of non-price average marginal cost, while v"(1) denotes
the second derivative of bt(i) evaluated at the steady-state.
15Given that "b;z > 0, this follows by combining properties (i) of proposition with equation (19).
16See the appendix for further details
17It is interesting to note that the elasticity z can be decomposed as follows:
z = " + sy
The coecient " measures the extent to which the optimal investment in non-price tools moves in order to com-
pensate for the impact of the relative prices on the demand price elasticity. The coecient sy instead relates
movements in non-price activities to variation in the marginal cost for producing consumption goods.
18In such a case, 
uctuations in expenditures for non-price tools are only due to aggregate shocks aecting the
opportunity cost and benets of investing in this tools.
14higher relative price. On the other hand, the lower marginal cost for producing goods increases
the marginal revenue of non-price activities, therefore making the latter more convenient.
As a second result, we note that in our framework, it is again possible to derive an expression
that relates, as in the canonical model, the in
ation rate to the average marginal cost and the
expected future in
ation.19 However, all else being equal, if rms engage in non-price competition,
we nd that the sensitivity of the in
ation rate to marginal cost increases.20 Hence, by amplifying
the overall response of in
ation to output, non-price competition among rms does aect in
ation
dynamics.
To get an intuition for this result, notice that the interaction between rms' pricing behavior
and non-price policy generates a mechanism that dampens the degree of strategic complementar-
ities in price-setting. In fact, by comparing the slope coecient np with the one we obtain in the
Kimball model, we note that while the nominal rigidities term is exactly the same, the real rigidi-
ties term is instead larger in our framework. This is an immediate implication of non-price policy
being strategically complementary to the rm's pricing behavior. In fact, by accommodating the
pricing policy with non-price tools, a rm essentially mitigates the eect upon its market share of
movements in its relative price. This follows by noticing that, for each variety i, the producer's
market share is given by:
^ yt(i)   ^ Yt = ( "p + "zz)~ pt(i) (25)
Accordingly, with non-price competition, the rm's relative output becomes less sensitive to
movements in its relative price.21 As a consequence, the rms' desired markup and its marginal cost
for producing goods react less to movements in relative output price, making the prot function less
steep around the point at which everybody charges the same price. Hence, the rms' opportunity
cost to move their relative output prices, when this is allowed, declines, thus amplifying the size
of price changes. As a result, if rms engage in non-price competition, in
ation becomes more
sensitive to movements in the real marginal cost.
Third, although the economic environment is characterized by real rigidities, we note that in
our framework, the price-setting decision of dierent producers might become strategic substitutes.
This feature is particularly striking, since in the Kimball model this is only possible by assuming
that the price elasticity of demand decreases in relative prices. To see this, take for simplicity the
case in which the non-constant elasticity of demand is the only source of real rigidity, and notice
that the rms' desired markup reads as:
^ t(i) = ""p["b;zz   1]~ pt(i) (26)
Strategic complementarity in price-setting implies that the elasticity of the rm's desired mark-
up with respect to its relative output price is negative. Equation (26) shows that this requirement
is not obviously satised if rms engage in non-price competition. In fact, the factor "b;zz does
not necessarily need to be lower than one. As such, producers may face strategic complementarity
in price-setting, despite the fact that we have assumed that the elasticity of demand is increasing
in the rms' relative prices. In such a circumstance, the dampening eect of non-price competition
would completely oset real rigidity in price-setting, thereby leading to an in
ation-marginal cost
coecient even larger than the Dixit-Stiglitz one.
Fourth, the slope np is a bounded and decreasing function of the elasticity ".22 Unlike the
Kimball model, however, in our framework, the lower bound is strictly positive. This property
19The New Keynesian Phillips Curve with non-price competition and the standard one are therefore observationally
equivalent.
20See property (i) of the proposition.
21This is true since the factor "zz is positive.
22This follows from property (ii) of the proposition.
15has two important and related implications that contrast with the canonical framework : (i) the
overall impact of quasi-kinked demand functions on the persistence of the real eects of monetary
policy shocks is bounded; and (ii) it is not obvious whether, for plausible calibrations of all the
remaining parameters, it is still possible to pin down a realistic value for the slope coecient np
by adjusting accordingly the elasticity ".
Oppositely,23 assuming Kimball preferences in Calvo-style models without non-price competi-
tion, by allowing for a non-constant elasticity of demand, generates a kind of strategic complemen-
tary that instead allows one to get any desired level of persistence in the real eect of monetary
policy shock and, for any given estimate of the Phillip's curve slope, to pin down a more plausible
degree of nominal rigidity. This feature is apparent from equation (21), which shows that the slope
coecient  is strictly decreasing in the elasticity of the markup function, ", converging to zero
as the latter goes to innity. As such, for any given value of the Calvo probability , it is always
possible to pin down " in order to set the slope coecient  to any desired level.
This property does not hold true in our framework, since with non-price competition, an
increase in the elasticity " generates two dierent eects: (i) as in standard models, each price-
setter faces a higher opportunity cost in changing price, since demand becomes more steep around
each rm's normal market share; and (ii) for each rm, an additional unit of relative spending
toward non-price competition becomes more eective in lowering the demand price elasticity. In









which shows that the eect of non-price activities on the elasticity of demand is stronger as " in-
creases.24 The second eect, missing in canonical models, osets the rst one, thereby attenuating
the overall impact upon the in
ation-marginal cost coecient of higher values of ".
As a nal remark, we note that the coecient 0 is greater than 1 for any admissible vector
of the model's structural parameters. This means that the dampening eect of non-price compe-
tition aects more real rigidity coming from quasi-kinked demand functions than that caused by
decreasing returns to scale. In fact, as is apparent from equation (23), the two coecients 0 and
1 respectively capture the partial eect of non-price competition on the in
ation-marginal cost
relationship through the real rigidity components " and sy.25
23See for instance Woodford (2003).

























=  "("p   1)"p
Finally, combining together these two expressions and using (16) in the resulting equation yields (27).
25To see this compare equation (21) with equation (23).
163 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the implications of non-price competition among rms in a Calvo-
style model characterized by strategic complementarity in price-setting. Under very general as-
sumptions, it has been shown that any activity by rms that expands their customer bases without
directly aecting their prices dampens at the same time the degree of real rigidity in price-setting.
This provides an answer to the main question of this paper: by increasing the in
ation-marginal
cost coecient, non-price competition among rms does aect in
ation dynamics.
Among other things, the theoretical results provided in this paper highlight the fact that non-
price competition generates a mechanism that dampens the overall impact of real rigidities on the
in
ation-marginal cost coecient. This eect could be strong enough to completely oset real
rigidity in price-setting. In such an extreme case, although the model economy is characterized by
quasi-kinked demand functions and local factors market, one would nd an in
ation marginal cost
coecient even larger than the Dixit-Stiglitz one. This suggests that abstracting from non-price
competition, as canonical models do, may potentially overstate the overall impact of real rigidities
on in
ation dynamics. This issue is particularly important, as real rigidities have became popular
among New Keynesian theorists precisely because they provide a mechanism to amplify the eect
of nominal disturbances and, all else being equal, to reduce the size of the Phillip curve's slope.
Our analysis casts some doubt regarding the robustness of such conclusions, at least with respect
to alternative specications of the rms' competition. However, the overall impact of non-price
competition on in
ation dynamics depends upon dierent mechanisms whose relative strength
in turn depends on the model's parametrization. Addressing this issue therefore requires the
specication and calibration of a full-
edged model through which it could be possible to evaluate
the implication for dierent sources of real rigidity. This issue goes far beyond the scope of this
paper, and we have therefore left it for future research.
17A Appendix. Proof of proposition 2
I) The New Keynesian Phillips curve
We will rst show that in our framework it is possible to derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve of the
form
^ t = Et^ t+1 + np^ t
where
np =




1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy]

Step 1. Deriving equation (19)
Let us start by noticing that in the non-stochastic steady state with zero in










where s and s are respectively the long-run average production marginal cost and average mark-up, while
Qr
s;s+k is the stochastic discount factor evaluated at the steady state. Plugging these relationships into the












k Et^ t+k(i) (A.1)
Our next goal is to nd an expression for both the rm's desired mark-up, ^ t(i), and the rm's production
marginal cost, ^ t(i). Using equation (18), one can easily prove the following:
^ t(i) =  
^ "p;t(i)
("p   1)














=  "("p   1)
h




where the last equality follows by using the denition of " to substitute out the derivative @"p;t(i)=@xt(i).
An expression for the rm i's log-linearized market share, ^ yt(i)   ^ Yt, can be derived from (3) as:
^ yt(i)   ^ Yt =  "p~ pt(i) + "b;z("p   1)~ zt(i) (A.2)
Therefore:
^ "p;t(i) =  "("p   1)"p ("b;z~ zt(i)   ~ pt(i)) (A.3)
^ t(i) = ""p ("b;z~ zt(i)   ~ pt(i)) (A.4)
Next, in order to nd an expression for the rm specic production marginal cost, it is convenient to




























18This formulation allows to express the elasticity of production marginal cost with respect to the rm's





























Log-linearizing equations (A.5) and (A.7) and solving for ^ t(i) yields:
^ t(i) = ^ t + sy

^ yt(i)   ^ Yt

Therefore, using (A.2) we can express the rm's specic production marginal cost as:
^ t(i) = ^ t + sy [("p   1)"b;z~ zt(i)   "p~ pt(i)] (A.8)













k "b;zEt~ zt+k(i) (A.9)
where   = [1 + "p(" + sy)].
Step 2. Finding an expression for ~ zt(i)
To model the evolution of the relative spending for non-price competition it is convenient to substitute




0(zt(i))(pt(i)   t(i)) = 't(i)










~ zt(i)   ("p   1)^ t(i) = ^ 't(i)










~ zt(i)   ("p   1)(^ t(i)   ^ t) = (^ 't(i)   ^ 't)
which, by using equation (A.8) to work out (^ t(i)   ^ t), can be equivalently rewritten as follows:

"2






b;z   v00(1) + "2




~ zt(i) = (^ 't(i)  ^ 't) (A.10)







































Therefore, log-linearizing equations (A.11) and (A.13) to obtain an expression for (^ 't(i)   ^ 't), substi-
tuting the resulting equation into (A.10) and solving for ~ zt(i), yields:










b;z   v00(1) + "2
b;z(2   "p) + "b;zsz + "2
b;z("p   1)2sy
Notice that, using (A.14), we can rewrite the rm i's market share and desired markup as follows:
^ yt(i)   ^ Yt = ( "p + "zz) ~ pt(i)
^ t(i) = ""p ("b;zz   1) ~ pt(i)
Step 3. Deriving the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Equation (A.14) implies that
Et~ zt+k(i) = zEt~ pt+k(i) 8 k > 0































b;z   00(1) + "2









b;z   00(1) + "2













As in the canonical models, this equation relates the price chosen at time t to only the future expected
path of average production marginal cost.26 Therefore, by using standard manipulations,27 we nally get
the following in
ation equation:
^ t = Et^ t+1 + np^ t
26The only dierence with the standard Kimball model is in fact represented by the term
f1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy]g, since in our framework it also involves the two coecients 0 and 1.
27See Gal  (2008) for a formal derivation.
20where
np =




1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy]

II) Proving property (i)
Our next goal is to show that if the model economy satises assumptions 1-5 then
np > 
where  is dened as in equation (21).
Proof : By comparing equation (21) with (23), one can easily show that this statement is equivalent of
proving that for any model economy satisfying assumptions 1-5, it must be true that:
0 < 1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy] < 1 + "p [" + sy]
In virtue of (A.15) and (A.16), this condition depends only upon a subset of all the model structural
parameters, that is the vector # = ["p;"b;z;sz;";sy;v00(1)]. Therefore, denoting with F the set of all the
vectors # that satisfy assumption 1-5, the statement can be proved by showing that:
0 < 1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy] < 1 + "p [" + sy] 8 # 2 F
Our rst issue is to characterize the set F. To this end, notice that each entry of # is a long run
elasticity that is obtained by evaluating the corresponding function at the non-stochastic steady-state with
zero in
ation. The latter is a symmetric equilibrium in which every producer charges the same price
(pt(i) = 1) and incurs in the same expenditures (zt(i) = 1) for non-price competition; in other words such
that:
xt(i) = 1 8 i 2 [0;1]
Therefore, we can explicitly characterize the set F by deriving all the restrictions that assumptions 1-5
impose on the vector of parameters # by focusing only on this symmetric equilibrium with zero in
ation.
To this end, notice rst that since "p > 1 and assumptions 1-4 imply both ["b;z;sz;";sy] 2 R4
+ and v00(1)
< 0, we must have:
F  (1;1)  R4
+  ( 1;0)
Assumption 5, in turn, imposes the existence of a unique global maximum for the prot function (12).
Since the latter is twice continuously dierentiable, this condition can be equivalently stated by requiring
that the Hessian matrix evaluated at a maximization point is negative denite. More precisely, denoting






































 det(H(1)) > 0










































































sy("p   1) +
"p   1
"p
+ ("p   1)"

< 0
Given that "p > 1 and that Ys is non-negative, this condition requires:

sy("p   1) +
"p   1
"p
+ ("p   1)"

> 0
However, since assumptions 2 and 4 imply that " and sy are both strictly positive, this condition is
always satised without imposing further restrictions to the parametric space.
Let us now evaluate the term @2(xt(i))=@2Zt(i). By double dierentiating the prot function with
respect to Zt(i) we obtain:
@2(xt(i))
@2Zt(i)































































Notice that in the derivation of this expression we have made use of equation (9) in order to evaluate
@"p;t(i)=@Zt(i). Hence, denoting with Zs the long-run aggregate level of expenditures for non-price compe-



































b;z   v00(1) + sz"b;z + sy("p   1)2"2








b;z   v00(1) + sz"b;z + sy("p   1)2"2




22However, the term (2   "p)"2
b;z is negative for "p > 2 and therefore (A.17) is not satised for every # 2
D = (1;1)R4
+ ( 1;0).Thus, the space of admissible vector # is restricted to a set F0 such that in the
symmetric equilibrium with zero in
ation condition (A.17) holds, that is:
F0 =






00(1) + sz"b;z + sy("p   1)
2"
2




As a nal issue, we have to characterize the restrictions imposed by the condition det(H(1)) > 0. In
order to do this, we have rst to determine the partial mixed derivative @2(xt(i))=@pt(i)@Zt(i). To this
end, notice rst that direct dierentiation of (12) implies:
@(xt(i))
@pt(i)











































[sy("p   1) + "p"]
Therefore, in the steady-state with zero in











sy("p   1) +
"p   1
"p




b;z("p   1)[sy("p   1) + "p"]
2
where $ is an auxiliary variable given by:
$ =  v00(1) + sz"b;z + (2   "p)"2
b;z
With simple algebra, it is possible to show that the previous condition reduces to:
1 + "p




b;z + $ + "2
b;z("p   1)2sy
> 0 (A.18)
Therefore, denoting with F1 the set of all the vectors satisfying condition (A.18), it must be true that:
F = F0 \ F1 (A.19)
The set F fully characterizes the space of all the vectors # satisfying assumptions 1-5. Moreover, for
any vector # 2 F it must be also true that:
1. 0 and 1 are both strictly positive
2. 1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy] > 0
3. 0 > 1
Given equations (A.15) and ((A.16), the rst condition follows immediately from (A.17), while the
second condition follows from (A.18) by noticing that:
1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy] = 1 + "p




b;z + $ + "2
b;z("p   1)2sy
(A.20)
The third condition follows by noticing that:






b;z   00(1) + "2
b;z(2   "p) + "b;zsz + "2
b;z("p   1)2sy
> 0
Thus, combining together the rst two conditions we nd:
0 < 1 + "p [(1   0)" + (1   1)sy] < 1 + "p [" + sy]8 # 2 F
This proves the statement.
23III) Proof of property (ii)
As nal issue, we want to prove that under assumption 1-5 the slope  is a decreasing and bounded
function of ", converging to a strictly positive number as " goes to innity.
Proof : Choose an arbitrary vector  = ["p;"b;z;sz;sy;v00(1)] 2 (1;1)  R3
+  ( 1;0) and let np(")
denotes the slope coecient (23) as a function of only the elasticity ". To ensure that assumption 1-5 are
satised, dene the set B as:
B =

" 2 R+ : Conditions (A:17) and (A:18) hold ; 2 (1;1)  R3
+  ( 1;0)
	
so that " 2 ("
;1), with "
 = inf B. The monotonically decreasing behavior of np(") follows from (23)
by noticing that direct dierentiation of (A.20) yields:








b;z + $ + "2
b;z("p   1)2sy
#2
> 0 8" 2 ("
;1)
This condition and (A.18) jointly imply:
0 < np(") < np("
) 8 " 2 ("
;1)
which in turn proves that np(") is a bounded function. To show that the lower bound is strictly positive,




1 + "p [(1    0)" + (1    1)sy] = 1 + lim
"!1
"p
















which, given (23), in turn implies:
lim
"!1np(") =





 v00(1) + "b;z [sy"b;z + sz + 2"b;z]
)
> 0
Therefore, we can conclude that:
np >





 v00(1) + "b;z [sy"b;z + sz + 2"b;z]
)
> 0 8 " 2 ("
;1)
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